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LENDER LIABILITY UNDER CERCLA
AND THE FLEET-ING PROTECTION OF
THE SECURED CREDITOR
EXEMPTION
by Timothy R. Zinnecker*
ONGRESS enacted the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA)1 in 1980 for the dual
purposes of (i) providing the federal government with a mechanism
by which it could promptly and effectively respond to the ever-increasing
health and environmental problems posed by improper disposal of hazard-
ous materials and (ii) imposing liability for remedying such problems on the
parties responsible for the problems, rather than on the general taxpayer.
2
* Associate in the Financial Services department of the Houston office of Johnson &
Gibbs, P.C. Brigham Young University, J.D., 1986; Central Missouri State University,
B.S.B.A., 1981.
1. Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988)). Con-
gress amended CERCLA in 1986 with the passage of the Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988)). For an excellent summary of caselaw interpreting various provi-
sions of CERCLA, see Barr, CERCLA Made Simple: An Analysis of the Cases Under the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980, 45 Bus.
LAW. 923 (May 1990).
2. See United States v. Aceto Agric. Chem. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1380 (8th Cir. 1989).
See also United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1553 (11th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 59 U.S.L.W. 3477 (U.S. Jan. 15, 1991) (No. 90-504) (CERCLA enacted "in response
to the environmental and public health hazards caused by the improper disposal of hazardous
wastes." Its "essential policy" places responsibility for cleanup on those who were responsible
for problems caused by such disposal.); Lone Pine Steering Comm. v. United States Envtl.
Protection Agency, 777 F.2d 882, 886 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 115 (1986) (noting
that goal of CERCLA is to promptly eliminate the sources of danger to health and environ-
ment presented by hazardous waste sites); United States v. New Castle County, 727 F. Supp.
854, 858 (D. Del. 1989) ("A major purpose behind CERCLA is to place the costs of cleanup of
designated hazardous sites on those responsible for the contamination."); Chemical Waste
Management, Inc. v. Armstrong World Indus., 669 F. Supp. 1285, 1290 n.6 (E.D. Pa. 1987)
("[T]he statute's objectives are the following: to encourage maximum care and responsibility
in the handling of hazardous waste; to provide for rapid response to environmental emergen-
cies; to encourage voluntary clean-up of hazardous waste spills; to encourage early reporting of
violations of the statute; and to ensure that parties responsible for release of hazardous sub-
stances bear the costs of response and costs of damage to natural resources."); United States v.
Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 576 (D. Md. 1986) ("Congress enacted CER-
CLA in 1980 in response to the environmental and public health hazards posed by improper
disposal of hazardous wastes.").
While the purposes underlying CERCLA are noble, the statute itself is not the model of
brilliant prose. See, e.g., Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1554 n.3 ("careless statutory drafting");
Aceto, 872 F.2d at 1380 n.8 ("hurriedly put together"); Artesian Water Co. v. New Castle
County, 851 F.2d 643, 648 (3d Cir. 1988) ("not a paradigm of clarity or precision .... inartful
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CERCLA authorizes the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to clean
up hazardous waste sites itself by using monies from a trust fund commonly
known as the "Superfund ' 3 and then to seek reimbursement for its expendi-
tures from responsible parties, who may include commercial lenders.
To successfully recover clean-up costs from a commercial lender, the EPA
must prove that the commercial lender falls within one of the statutorily
prescribed classes of responsible parties,4 including "the owner and operator
of a vessel or a facility, [and] any person who at the time of disposal of any
hazardous substance owned or operated any facility at which such hazard-
ous substances were disposed of . . . . 5 The statute defines "owner and
operator" in a somewhat circular fashion to include any person owning or
drafting and numerous ambiguities .... use of inadequately defined terms .... circuitous
language"); Tanglewood East Homeowners v. Charles-Thomas, Inc., 849 F.2d 1568, 1572 (5th
Cir. 1988) ("not a model of clarity"); Maryland Bank, 632 F. Supp. at 578 ("hastily patched
together .... hastily conceived").
3. The Superfund is financed through a combination of federal appropriations, industry
taxes and judgments entered against responsible parties. See 26 U.S.C. § 9507(b) (1988). Con-
gress appropriated $8,500,000,000 into the Superfund for the five-year period beginning Octo-
ber 17, 1986, 42 U.S.C. § 9611 (Supp. 1990), and $5,100,000,000 for the three-year period
beginning October 1, 1991, 5 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) 752 (Nov. 7, 1990). Its initial appropria-
tion in 1980 was $1,600,000,000. See Barr, supra note 1, at 953.
4. The EPA also must establish the "disposal" of a "hazardous substance" at a "facility"
and must prove that its costs are statutorily recoverable. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1988). The
statute defines "disposal" as:
the discharge, deposit, injection, dumping, spilling, leaking, or placing of any
solid waste or hazardous waste into or on any land or water so that such solid
waste or hazardous waste or any constituent thereof may enter the environment
or be emitted into the air or discharged into any waters, including ground
waters.
42 U.S.C. § 6903(3).
"Hazardous substance" is defined to include certain substances, elements, compounds, mix-
tures, solutions, wastes, and pollutants which (i) are described with more particularity in the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act (33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq. (1988)), the Solid Waste Dispo-
sal Act (42 U.S.C. § 6921 et seq. (1988)), or the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. § 7412 et seq.
(1988)), (ii) "when released into the environment may present substantial danger to the public
health or welfare or the environment," or (iii) are an "imminently hazardous chemical sub-
stance or mixture" as defined at 15 U.S.C. § 2606. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (1988). See also
40 C.F.R. § 401.15 (1989) (list of 65 "toxic pollutants" under the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act); id. § 61.01(a) (list of eight "hazardous air pollutants" under the Clean Air Act);
id. § 302.4, Table 302.4 (45-page list of "hazardous substances" promulgated by EPA under 42
U.S.C. § 9602(a) (1988)).
"Facility" is defined as:
(A) any building, structure, installation, equipment, pipe or pipeline (including
any pipe into a sewer or publicly owned treatment works), well, pit, pond, la-
goon, impoundment, ditch, landfill, storage container, motor vehicle, rolling
stock, or aircraft, or (B) any site or area where a hazardous substance has been
deposited, stored, disposed of, or placed, or otherwise come to be located; but
does not include any consumer product in consumer use or any vessel.
42 U.S.C. § 9601(9) (1988).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(l)-(2) (1988). CERCLA also imposes liability against:
any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal or
treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or treat-
ment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person, by any other
party or entity, at any facility or incineration vessel owned or operated by an-
other party or entity and containing such hazardous substances, and ... any
person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for transport to dis-
posal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites selected by such person,
1450 [Vol. 44
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operating a facility, and, if title to or control of the facility has been con-
veyed to a state or local government as a result of bankruptcy, foreclosure,
tax delinquency, abandonment, or similar means, then the person who
owned, operated, or otherwise controlled activities at such facility immedi-
ately before such conveyance. 6 Commercial lenders find comfort in the defi-
nition's express exemption from liability of any person "who, without
participating in the management of... a facility, holds indicia of ownership
primarily to protect his security interest in the ... facility."
'7
Because neither the statute nor the legislative history offers guidance on
the phrase "participating in the management," the task of articulating what
a lender can and cannot do before losing the protection afforded by the se-
cured creditor exemption has fallen to the courts, which, unfortunately for
the banking community, have not rendered favorable decisions. Some courts
have concluded that they need not interpret the phrase if the lender has
foreclosed on the property because the statutory exclusion affords no protec-
tion to a lender after foreclosure.8 In a recent decision even more alarming
to the financial community, the first federal appellate court to address the
parameters of lender liability under CERCLA held that a lender can be lia-
ble for environmental clean-up costs if its involvement with the management
of the facility is sufficiently broad to support the inference that it could affect
the borrower's hazardous waste disposal decisions if it chose to do so.9
After summarizing the leading cases addressing lender liability under
CERCLA, this article examines the reasons offered by those courts that have
concluded that the safe harbor of the secured creditor exemption is unavaila-
ble to lenders who have foreclosed on their interests. This article contends
that none of the reasons justify such a legal conclusion. In addition, this
article criticizes the standard of liability articulated by the Eleventh Circuit
in United States v. Fleet Factors 10 and concludes that, contrary to the court's
opinion, the standard discourages lenders from monitoring the environmen-
from which there is a release, or a threatened release which causes the incur-
rence of response costs, of a hazardous substance.
Id. § 9607(a)(3)-(4) (1988). Although not inconceivable, most commercial lenders rarely, if
ever, would engage in activities that would trigger liability under these latter two classes of
responsible parties. But see Tanglewood East Homeowners, 849 F.2d at 1573-74.
6. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1988). See also United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 724 F.
Supp. 15, 19 (D.R.I. 1989), aff'd in part, 910 F.2d 24 (1st Cir. 1990), petition for cert. filed, 59
U.S.L.W. 3406 (U.S. Dec. 4, 1990) (No. 90-816) ("CERCLA's definition of 'owner or opera-
tor' is not especially illuminating."); Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 685
F. Supp. 651 (N.D. Ill. 1988), aff'd, 861 F.2d 155, 156 (7th Cir. 1988) ("The definition of
'owner or operator' for purposes of earthbound sites must come from a source other than the
text. The circularity strongly implies, however, that the statutory terms have their ordinary
meanings rather than unusual or technical meanings."). The legislative history offers little
additional insight. See infra notes 70-71, 76.
7. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1988).
8. See Guidice v. BFG Electroplating & Mfg. Co., 732 F. Supp. 556, 562-63 (W.D. Pa.
1989); United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 578-80 (D. Md. 1986)
632 F. Supp. at 578-80. But see In re Bergsoe Metal Corp., 910 F.2d 668, 671-72 (9th Cir.
1990); United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,992, 20,996 (E.D. Pa.
Sept. 4, 1985).
9. United States v. Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d 1550, 1558 (11th Cir. 1990).
10. Id.
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tal problems of their borrowers and thus increases the likelihood that the
EPA will bear the initial, if not the ultimate, responsibility for remedying
environmental problems.
I. SUMMARY OF THE CASELAW
A. United States v. Mirabile 11
In 1973, American Bank and Trust Company (ABT) made a loan to Ar-
thur C. Mangels Industries (Mangels) that was partially secured by a paint-
manufacturing plant. In 1976, Turco Coatings (Turco) acquired almost all
of the stock of Mangels and continued to manufacture paint on the site.
Girard Bank, a predecessor of Mellon Bank, made a working capital line of
credit available to Turco in 1976 that was secured by inventory and other
personal property. In 1979, Turco executed a $150,000 promissory note
payable to the Small Business Administration (SBA) secured by a second
mortgage on the plant, second-lien security interests in other assets and
pledged stock. After the bankruptcy court dismissed Turco's bankruptcy
petition, ABT foreclosed on the. site and was the highest bidder at the sher-
iff's sale in August 1981. In December 1981, ABT assigned its bid to
Thomas A. Mirabile, who, together with his wife, Anna, accepted a sheriff's
deed to the property.
In 1983, the EPA sued the Mirabiles to recover its clean-up costs of
$250,000 incurred in removing approximately 550 drums of hazardous waste
discovered during an inspection in February 1983. The Mirabiles then sued
ABT and Mellon as third-party defendants, alleging that exercise by these
lenders of financial control over the facility made them liable. ABT and
Mellon impleaded the SBA, urging that if their activities triggered liability,
then the SBA also should be liable.
Relying on the protection afforded by the secured creditor exemption, all
three lenders moved for summary judgment. The court in Mirabile observed
that "the exemption plainly suggests that provided a secured creditor does
not become overly entangled in the affairs of the actual owner or operator of
a facility, the creditor may not be held liable for cleanup costs."1 2 In deter-
mining the type of activities in which a lender could safely engage, the court
distinguished involvement in financial aspects of management from partici-
pation in day-to-day production aspects of the business, a distinction, in the
court's opinion, supported by the statute itself.
I note that the exemption from liability is afforded to secured creditors
who do not participate in the management of a "facility." . . . The
reference to management of the "facility," as opposed to management
of the affairs of the actual owner or operator of the facility, suggests
once again that the participation which is critical is participation in op-
erational, production, or waste disposal activities. Mere financial ability
to control waste disposal practices of the sort possessed by the secured
11. 15 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,992.
12. Id. at 20,995.
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creditors in this case appears insufficient for imposition of liability.13
In reviewing activities of each lender, the court noted that during the four-
month period between the sheriff's sale and ABT's assignment of its bid to
the Mirabiles, ABT secured the building against vandalism by boarding up
windows and changing locks, made inquiries as to the approximate costs of
disposal of various drums located on the property, and, through its loan
officer, visited the property on various occasions for the purpose of showing
it to prospective purchasers.' 4 In the court's opinion, ABT was entitled to
summary judgment because it had not "participate[d] in the day-to-day op-
erational aspects of the site. In the instant case, ABT merely foreclosed on
the property after all operations had ceased and thereafter took prudent and
routine steps to secure the property against further depreciation."' 5
The court also granted the SBA's motion for summary judgment, despite
the fact that the SBA's loan agreement allegedly contemplated some involve-
ment which the Mirabiles construed as participation in day-to-day manage-
ment.16 The loan agreement also limited annual compensation of operating
officers and prohibited the purchase of life insurance and the payment of
dividends or advances to company officers absent the SBA's prior written
consent. The court found no evidence that the SBA had actually partici-
pated in management and did "not believe participation in purely financial
aspects of operation, of the sort which occurred here, [was] sufficient to
bring a lender within the scope of CERCLA liability."' 1
7
The activity of Mellon Bank presented a "cloudier situation."' 8 After
Mellon Bank made its initial advance to Turco, Turco's president established
an advisory board to oversee Turco's operations. One member of this board
was Brett Sauers, the loan officer initially responsible for the Turco account.
Because production was not discussed at advisory board meetings and Sau-
ers' participation in the advisory board was limited to input into general
financial matters, the court held that Sauers' activities did not trigger CER-
CLA liability. ' 9
Nevertheless, the court denied Mellon Bank's motion for summary judg-
ment because of the uncertainty surrounding the degree of loan officer Mc-
Williams' post-bankruptcy oversight of Turco.20 McWilliams had testified
that he became involved with Turco because his superiors at Mellon wanted
him to have " 'more of a day-to-day hands-on involvement.' He described
this involvement as including monitoring the cash collateral accounts, ensur-
ing that receivables went to the proper account, and establishing a reporting
system between the company and the bank."21 The court did not believe
13. Id.
14. Id. at 20,996.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 20,997.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
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such activity would create CERCLA liability,22 but evidence also indicated
that McWilliams frequently visited the site and insisted on certain manufac-
turing changes and personnel reassignments. In addition, deposition testi-
mony included such remarks as "Girard Bank had obvious, whatever,
control," Mellon Bank "became more heavily involved in the day-to-day op-
erations" of Turco, and "Turco would have to accept the day-to-day super-
vision of [a bank officer] if it wanted to continue operations with Girard
funds."'23 The court concluded that such evidence presented a genuine issue
of fact as to whether Mellon Bank, through its predecessor Girard Bank,
engaged in the sort of managerial participation that would bring a secured
creditor within the scope of CERCLA liability.24
B. United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Company25
In 1980, Mark McLeod used proceeds of a $335,000 loan from Maryland
Bank & Trust Company (Maryland Bank) to purchase property on which
his parents operated a trash and garbage business. The loan was secured by
a mortgage on the property. After Mark defaulted on the loan, Maryland
Bank foreclosed on the farm in 1981 and purchased the property at a fore-
closure sale in May 1982.
In 1983, McLeod informed a local environmental official of the existence
of dumped wastes on the farm. State officials then contacted the EPA,
which removed 237 drums of chemical material and 1,180 tons of contami-
nated soil at a cost of approximately $552,000, after Maryland Bank de-
clined to take any corrective action. Litigation ensued when Maryland Bank
refused to reimburse the EPA for its clean-up costs.
As in Mirabile, the success of Maryland Bank's motion for summary judg-
ment hinged on whether Maryland Bank was an "owner or operator" of the
farm under CERCLA or whether it fell outside the definition under the se-
cured creditor exemption. 26 Relying on the verb tense of the exemption, the
court held that the protective language was available only to those persons
whose security interest existed at the time of clean-up. 27 Believing that
Maryland Bank held indicia of ownership primarily to protect its security
interest only as long as it was a mortgagee and not a title holder, the court
imposed liability.28 "The exclusion does not apply to former mortgagees
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986).
26. The court first observed that it was undisputed that Maryland Bank had been the
owner of the facility since May 1982. However, the parties disputed whether the bank had
been the operator of the facility since that time. Notwithstanding the conjunctive nature of the
statutory phrase, "the owner and operator," the court held that a party need not be both an
owner and operator to incur liability. Id. at 577. "Proper usage dictates that the phrase 'the
owner and operator' include only those persons who are both owners and operators. But by no
means does Congress always follow the rules of grammar when enacting the laws of this na-
tion." Id. at 578.
27. Id. at 579.
28. Id.
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currently holding title after purchasing the property at a foreclosure sale, at
least when, as here, the former mortgagee has held the title for nearly four
years, and a full year before the EPA clean-up."'29 In the court's opinion, a
contrary holding would result in windfalls to mortgagees who, able to
purchase properties cheaply at foreclosure sales because other prospective
purchasers would face potential liability, would wait for government clean-
up and thereafter sell the marketable sites at a profit.
30
C. Guidice v. BFG Electroplating & Manufacturing Co.
3 1
Local residents sued BFG Electroplating & Manufacturing Company
(BFG) in 1986 for unlawfully contaminating the environment and causing
personal injuries. BFG filed a third-party complaint against current and
past owners of the adjacent property on which Berlin Metal Polishers'
(BMP) treatment facility was located, including National Bank of the Com-
monwealth (NBC). NBC had held a mortgage on the property to secure one
of two loans to BMP. After BMP defaulted on its loans, NBC purchased the
property at a sheriff's sale in April 1982 and held title until January 1983.
NBC did not dispute that drums containing hazardous materials were on
the property during its ownership. Evidence also indicated that some drums
were in a rusted condition, did not have lids, and were located in an area of
the plant where water dripped from the ceiling and the floor was cracked.
Nevertheless, as in Mirabile and Maryland Bank, NBC argued that it was
entitled to summary judgment because it was neither an "owner or opera-
tor" of the property when hazardous wastes were allegedly released and dis-
posed. The court examined the merits of NBC's motion by examining the
periods before and after foreclosure. 32
Prior to foreclosure during its five-year period as mortgagee, NBC had (a)
made additional loans to BMP secured by the property or accounts receiva-
ble, (b) received periodic financial statements from BMP, (c) met with BMP
officials to discuss the status of accounts, personnel changes, and presence of
raw materials, (d) actively assisted BMP in obtaining financing from the
Small Business Administration, (e) communicated with state and local envi-
ronmental officials in an effort to assist BMP in complying with wastewater
discharge laws, (f) visited and inspected the property through NBC's agent,
29. Id. The court rebutted Maryland Bank's reliance on Mirabile by noting that Mirabile
"pertained to a situation in which the mortgagee-turned-owner promptly assigned the prop-
erty. To the extent to which that opinion suggests a rule of broader application, this Court
respectfully disagrees. The legislative history and policies behind the Act counsel against such
a generous reading of § 101(20)(A)'s exclusion." Id. at 580 (footnote omitted).
30. Id. The court also denied that part of the bank's motion for summary judgment con-
cerning applicability of the so-called third party defense codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3)
(1988). 632 F. Supp. at 581-82. For a discussion of this defense, which is beyond the scope of
this article, see Corash & Behrendt, Lender Liability under CERCLA: Search for a Safe Har-
bor, 43 S.w. L.J. 863, 875-78 (1990); Klotz & Siakotos, Lender Liability Under Federal and
State Environmental Law: Of Deep Pockets, Debt Defeat and Deadbeats, 92 COM. L.J. 275,
280-81 (1987); Comment, "Buying into Trouble - Lender Liability Under CERCLA and
SARA," 14 S. ILL. U.L.J. 319, 328-34 (1990).
31. Guidice v. BFG Electroplating & Mfg. Co., 732 F. Supp. 556 (W.D. Pa. 1989).
32. Id. at 561-64.
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and (g) discussed loan restructures with BMP officials. Finding no evidence
suggesting that NBC controlled operational, production, or waste disposal
activities at the plant, the court concluded that NBC's actions "were prudent
measures undertaken to protect its security interest in the property" and
were "insufficient to void the security interest exemption of CERCLA."
33
The court held that the security interest exemption was unavailable to
NBC after foreclosure, however, and offered two reasons for its ruling.
34
First, as noted in Maryland Bank, holding otherwise would permit a mortga-
gee-turned-owner to reap the windfall of the increased value of the improved
property. 35 Second, 1986 amendments to CERCLA exempted state and lo-
cal governments who involuntarily acquired title through bankruptcy, tax
delinquency, abandonment, or similar means from liability as owners or op-
erators.36 "That Congress did not simultaneously amend the statute to ex-
clude from liability lenders who acquire property through foreclosure might
indicate that Congress intended to hold them liable as owners." 37
D. United States v. Fleet Factors Corp.
38
In 1976, Fleet Factors Corporation agreed to advance funds to Swains-
boro Print Works (SPW) against the assignment of SPW's accounts receiva-
ble and a security interest in SPW's cloth printing plant, equipment,
inventory, and fixtures. A court declared SPW bankrupt in December 1981
and appointed a trustee to supervise the liquidation of assets. Fleet Factors
foreclosed on its security interest in certain inventory and equipment, some
of which was sold at a public auction in June 1982 by Fleet Factors' contrac-
tual agent, Baldwin Industrial Liquidators. In August 1982, Fleet Factors
contracted with Nix Riggers to remove any equipment remaining after the
public sale. Fleet Factors never foreclosed on the facility, which was con-
veyed to Emanuel County, Georgia, at a tax lien foreclosure sale in July
1987.
Following an inspection of the plant in 1984, the EPA disposed of 700
fifty-five gallon drums of toxic chemicals and removed forty-four truckloads
of materials containing asbestos. The EPA alleged that most of the drums
were at the facility at the time of Fleet Factors' public auction in June 1982
33. Id. at 562 (citation omitted). The court offered the following policy reasons for its
holding:
A goal of CERCLA is safe handling and disposal of hazardous waste. To en-
courage banks to monitor a debtor's use of security property, a high liability
threshold will enhance the dual purposes of protection of the banks' investments
and promoting CERCLA's policy goals. Conversely, a low liability standard
would encourage a lender to terminate its association with a financially troubled
debtor and expedite loan payments in an effort to recover the debts.
Id. (footnote omitted).
34. Id. at 563.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. 724 F. Supp. 955 (S.D. Ga. 1988), aff'd and remanded, 901 F.2d 1550 (1 1th Cir.),
reh'g denied, 911 F.2d 742 (11th Cir. 1990) (en banc), cert. denied, 59 U.S.L.W. 3477 (U.S.
Jan. 15, 1991) (No. 90-504).
[Vol. 441456
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and that removal of equipment or machinery by the purchasers or Riggers
disturbed asbestos allegedly in pipes connected to the equipment or machin-
ery. The EPA sought to collect its costs of approximately $400,000 from
Fleet Factors and certain other parties.
The EPA conceded that Fleet Factors never had been an "owner" of the
facility within the meaning of CERCLA. It argued, however, that Fleet
Factors was liable as an "operator" of the facility because its activities both
before and after the public auction constituted participation in management
sufficient to preclude protection afforded by the secured creditor exemption.
Specifically, the EPA asserted that after SPW ceased its operations and be-
gan to wind down its affairs, Fleet Factors (a) required SPW to seek its ap-
proval prior to shipping goods to customers, (b) established prices for SPW's
excess inventory, (c) dictated when and to whom SPW shipped its finished
goods, (d) involved itself in personnel matters, (e) controlled access to SPW's
facility, and (f) contracted with a third party to dispose of machinery and
equipment.
The district court interpreted the phrases "participating in the manage-
ment of a . . . facility" and "primarily to protect his security interest" as
permitting a secured lender "to provide financial assistance and general, and
even isolated instances of specific, management advice to its debtors without
risking CERCLA liability, if the secured creditor does not participate in the
day-to-day management of the business or facility either before or after the
business ceases operation."' 39 The court then concluded as a matter of law
that Fleet Factors' activities prior to the public auction were insufficient to
result in liability. 40 Nevertheless, precluding summary judgment, the court
held that Fleet Factors' dispute with the EPA's allegations concerning
movement of toxic-filled drums and the effect of removal of equipment and
machinery on asbestos-filled pipes might trigger liability.41
The appellate panel noted that it was undisputed that Fleet Factors held a
mortgage primarily to protect its security interest in the facility.42 "The crit-
ical issue is whether Fleet participated in management sufficiently to incur
liability under the statute."' 43 After noting that no other federal appellate
39. 724 F. Supp. at 960.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. 901 F.2d at 1556.
43. Id. Initially, the appellate panel had determined whether Fleet Factors was liable
under 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1) as the "present" owner or operator of the property. The court
held that the quoted term should be construed at the time when the plaintiff filed its complaint,
and under such a construction, Emanuel County was the "present" owner or operator of the
facility. Id. Except in certain circumstances inapplicable here, however, the owner or opera-
tor of a facility whose title has been conveyed to a governmental entity due to bankruptcy,
foreclosure, tax delinquency, abandonment, or similar means is the person who owned, oper-
ated, or otherwise controlled activities at the facility "immediately beforehand." 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601(20)(A)(iii) (1988). Although Fleet Factors never had foreclosed on the mortgaged
property and had not been on the premises since December 1983, the government argued that
Fleet Factors was liable because it was the last entity to exercise "control" over the facility.
The court held that acceptance of such an interpretation of "immediately beforehand" would
"torture the plain statutory meaning" of the statute. Instead, the court interpreted the phrase
to mean "without intervening ownership, operation, and control." 901 F.2d at 1555. The
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court had interpreted the secured creditor exemption, the court summarized
and rejected positions asserted by the government and Fleet Factors." The
government argued that the exemption afforded no protection to a secured
creditor who participated in any manner in managing the facility. In the
panel's opinion, the government's construction "would largely eviscerate the
exemption Congress intended to afford to secured creditors" and "could ex-
pose all such [secured] lenders to CERCLA liability for engaging in their
normal course of business."' 45 Fleet Factors, on the other hand, favored the
distinction delineated by Mirabile between permissible participation in finan-
cial management of the facility and impermissible participation in day-to-
day or operational management of the facility. The court rejected such an
interpretation as being "too permissive towards secured creditors" 46 and
"ignor[ing] the plain language of the exemption and essentially render[ing] it
meaningless. Individuals and entities involved in the operations of a facility
are already liable as operators under the express language of section
9607(a)(2). ' '47 The court then penned its own standard of liability:
Under the standard we adopt today, a secured creditor may incur sec-
tion 9607(a)(2) liability, without being an operator, 4a by participating in
the financial management of a facility to a degree indicating a capacity
to influence the corporation's treatment of hazardous wastes. It is not
necessary for the secured creditor actually to involve itself in the day-to-
day operations of the facility in order to be liable - although such
conduct will certainly lead to the loss of the protection of the statutory
exemption. Nor is it necessary for the secured creditor to participate in
management decisions relating to hazardous waste. Rather, a secured
creditor will be liable if its involvement with the management of the
facility is sufficiently broad to support the inference that it could affect
hazardous waste disposal decisions if it so chose. We, therefore, specifi-
court held that Fleet Factors could not be the present owner or operator under such an inter-
pretation. Id.
44. Id. at 1556-57.
45. Id. at 1556.
46. Id. at 1557.
47. Id.
48. "For an example of activity that could subject a secured creditor to liability as an
operator, see [United States of America v.] Kayser-Roth Corp., 724 F. Supp. [15,] 22-23
[(D.R.I. 1989)]." Id. at 1557 n. 10. Kayser-Roth did not involve a secured creditor; it involved
a parent corporation's potential responsibility for its subsidiary's liability under CERCLA.
The court had little trouble finding that Kayser-Roth Corporation controlled the management
and operations of its subsidiary, Stamina Mills, to such a degree that Kayser-Roth could be
deemed an "operator." 724 F. Supp. at 22.
Kayser-Roth exercised pervasive control over Stamina Mills through, among
other things: 1) its total monetary control including collection of accounts paya-
ble; 2) its restrictions on Stamina Mills' financial budget; 3) its directive that
subsidiary-governmental contact, including environmental matters, be funneled
directly through Kayser-Roth; 4) its requirement that Stamina Mills' leasing,
buying or selling of real estate first be approved by Kayser-Roth; 5) its policy
that Kayser-Roth approve any capital transfer or expenditures greater than
$5,000; and finally, 6) its placement of Kayser-Roth personnel in almost all
Stamina Mills' director and officer positions, as a means of totally ensuring that
Kayser-Roth corporate policy was exactly implemented and precisely carried
out.
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cally reject the formulation of the secured creditor exception suggested
by the district court in Mirabile .... 49
Under this new standard, the court held that Fleet Factors' involvement
in the financial management of the plant as alleged by the EPA was perva-
sive, if not complete.50 Such involvement permitted the court to remove the
protection afforded by the secured creditor exemption and impose liability as
a matter of law. 51
E. In Re Bergsoe Metal Corporation 52
In December 1979, the Port of St. Helens sold fifty acres of land to Berg-
soe Metal Corporation (BMC) on which to construct a lead recycling plant
and related pollution control equipment. In exchange, BMC executed a
$400,000 promissory note secured by a mortgage on the property. Through
a series of transactions through June 1981, BMC, the Port, and United
States National Bank of Oregon (Bank) completed the bond financing.
BMC conveyed the warranty deed to the property and the plant to the Port,
which executed leases in favor of BMC. To secure its obligations under the
bonds, the Port mortgaged the property and the plant to the Bank and also
assigned all of its right, title, and interest in the two leases to the Bank.
Pursuant to the leases, BMC paid its lease payments to the Bank to retire the
indebtedness evidenced by the bonds.
The plant began experiencing difficulties shortly after operations com-
menced in 1982 and closed in 1986. The Bank then put BMC into involun-
tary bankruptcy, but not before Oregon officials determined that various
hazardous substances had contaminated the plant site. The Bank and the
bankruptcy trustee sought a declaratory judgment that BMC's parent com-
panies (collectively, EAC) 53 were liable for the environmental clean-up
costs. In turn, EAC filed a third-party complaint alleging that the Bank and
the Port were liable for clean-up under CERCLA. The bankruptcy court
granted the Port's motion for summary judgment, and the district court
affirmed.54
EAC's success on appeal depended on its ability to create a material issue
of whether the Port was an owner under CERCLA. The appellate court
noted that although the Port held legal title to the property and plant, this
fact alone was not dispositive.5 5 "[U]nder the security interest exception the
court must determine why the Port holds such indicia of ownership. Here,
there is no doubt that the Port has the deed in the plant primarily to ensure
that [BMC] would meet its obligations under the leases and therefore under
49. Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1557-58 (footnote omitted).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1559.
52. 910 F.2d 668 (9th Cir. 1990).
53. Bergsoe's stock was held by The East Asiatic Company, Ltd., The East Asiatic Com-
pany, Inc., and Heidelberg Eastern, Inc. Id. at 669.
54. Id. at 670.
55. The court did not discuss the contrary holdings of Maryland Bank and Guidice. See
supra notes 26-30, 33-37 and accompanying text.
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the bonds."'56
Nor could EAC persuade the court that the secured creditor exemption
failed to apply because the Port participated in managing the BMC plant.
EAC pointed to three facts that allegedly demonstrated managerial partici-
pation. First, the Port had negotiated and encouraged plant construction.
Second, the leases gave the Port the right to inspect the premises and to re-
enter and take possession upon foreclosure. Third, the Port participated in
management through its actions in giving a successor manager control of the
plant.
The court gave short shrift to each argument. First, the court stated that
to hold that encouragement and negotiation constitute managerial participa-
tion would render the exclusionary language meaningless, for all contracting
parties engage in such conduct. 5" Second, the court held that there was no
evidence that the Port exercised any of its rights under the leases.58 "What
is critical is not what rights the Port had, but what it did. The CERCLA
security interest exception uses the active 'participating in management
stardard.' Regardless of what rights the Port may have had, it cannot have
participated in management if it never exercised them." 59 And third, the
court held that the Port never entered into any contract with the successor
manager, nor did EAC offer evidence of any negotiations between the two
entities.6° Finding no managerial participation, the appellate court held that
the Port was not an "owner" under CERCLA and affirmed the bankruptcy
court's summary judgment in favor of the Port.
II. TITLE HOLDERS AND THE SECURED CREDITOR EXEMPTION
In both Mirabile and Bergsoe Metal, lenders successfully claimed the pro-
tections afforded by the secured creditor exemption despite holding title to
the tainted property.61 In Maryland Bank and Guidice, however, such pro-
56. Bergsoe, 910 F.2d at 671 (emphasis in original). Unlike lenders in Mirabile, Maryland
Bank, Guidice, and Fleet Factors, the Port held title not to secure repayment of its own credit,
but "to ensure that Bergsoe would meet its obligations under the leases and therefore under the
bonds" and as a "guarantee that Bergsoe would cover the Port's own indebtedness [to the
Bank] under the bonds." Id. at 671. In Judge Kozinski's words, "[t]his does not change the
analysis." Id. at 671. Originally, the Port held title to secure BMC's rental payments under
the leases. Once the Port assigned the leases to the Bank, however, BMC and the Port no
longer enjoyed a debtor-creditor relationship. In the absence of such a relationship, query how
the Ninth Circuit could so easily conclude that the Port held not only a security interest, but
also indicia of ownership primarily to protect its security interest. Id. at 673. The answer may
rest in the loan documents not discussed in the opinion.
57. Id. at 672.
58. Id. at 672-73.
59. Id. at 672-73 & n.3. Query whether the Port could have exercised any power under
the leases since it had assigned them to the Bank.
Unlike the Eleventh Circuit, the Bergsoe court declined to rule on the degree of managerial
participation necessary to trigger CERCLA liability. Id. at 672. The court found it clear that,
whatever the statutory parameters of participation, some actual management is necessary
before a secured creditor will fall outside the exception. Finding none in the instant case, the
court refused to engage in line drawing. Id. at 672.
60. Id. at 673.
61. See supra notes 15, 55-60 and accompanying text.
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tection magically disappeared when the financial institutions acquired title.62
This section of the article examines the reasons offered in the latter two
cases; the examination reveals that such reasons do not support the legal
conclusion that a title holder cannot successfully invoke the secured creditor
exemption.63
A. The Verb Tense
The court in Maryland Bank held that the secured creditor exemption
"covers only those persons who, at the time of the clean-up, hold indicia of
ownership to protect a then-held security interest in the land. The verb tense
of the exclusionary language is critical. The security interest must exist at
the time of the clean-up." 64 Any legal conclusion resting on the verb tense
of the exclusion is somewhat tenuous, however, especially when the entire
statute is far from a model of clarity. As the court admitted earlier in its
opinion, "[b]y no means does Congress always follow the rules of grammar
when enacting the laws of this nation." 6 5
B. The Common-Law Mortgagee
To its credit, the Maryland Bank court looked beyond the rules of gram-
mar and examined legislative history. In the court's opinion, the latter re-
vealed that the secured creditor exemption was incorporated into the statute
to prevent imposition of liability upon a mortgagee who would be deemed
the "title holder" of the property under the common law of a handful of
states.66 By no means could Congress have intended to protect all mortga-
gees who later acquired title.6 7
Although plausible,68 this reasoning nevertheless fails to support a per se
legal conclusion that a title holder cannot avail itself of the secured creditor
exemption. As defined, "owner or operator" includes "any person owning
62. See supra notes 26-30, 33-37 and accompanying text.
63. For a contrary viewpoint, however, see Note, When a Security Becomes a Liability:
Claims Against Lenders in Hazardous Waste Cleanup, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 1261, 1285-96 (1987).
64. United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 579 (D. Md. 1986).
65. Id. at 578. See also id. at 578 n.2 (syntactical irregularities render statutory interpre-
tation difficult).
66. Id. at 579.
67. Id. at 579-80.
68. But see Burcat, Environmental Liability of Creditors: Open Season on Banks, Credi-
tors, and Other Deep Pockets, 103 BANKING L. J. 509, 532 (1986):
A literal reading of Maryland Bank & Trust Co. shows that the court ruled the
security interest exception protects only those creditors who hold a security in-
terest in property in Maryland and twelve other states in which common-law
title mortgages are in effect. In those jurisdictions, the protection lasts only until
foreclosure. Under this interpretation, the security interest exception is a virtual
tabula rasa. The so-called exception really provides no protection for creditors
under this interpretation.
Id. at 532; see also id. at 534 ("The Maryland Bank & Trust Co. court's restriction of the
security interest exception makes it a virtual nullity. Under the court's interpretation, only
mortgagees in thirteen states have some limited protection. Presumably, mortgagees in other
states and secured creditors holding security other than a mortgage have no protection under
CERCLA.") (emphasis in original).
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or operating [an onshore or offshore] facility," but excludes "a person, who,
without participating in the management of a vessel or facility, holds indicia
of ownership primarily to protect his security interest in the ... facility." '69
The legislative history indicates that indicia of ownership includes actual
title.70 When read together, therefore, the exclusionary language in the stat-
ute and the legislative history make clear that a lender can hold such indicia
of ownership and not be liable as an owner or operator if (a) the lender is
holding title primarily to protect his security interest and (b) while holding
title, the lender is not participating in the management of the facility. 71
69. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1988).
70. See H.R. REP. No. 172, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 36, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6160, 6181 (" 'Owner' is defined to include not only those persons
who hold title to a vessel or facility but those who, in the absence of holding a title, possess
some equivalent evidence of ownership."); H.R. REP. No. 172, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 2,
reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6212, 6213 [hereinafter H.R. REP. 172]
("Section 101(x) of H.R. Rep. 85 defines the term 'owner' as any person holding title to, or in
the absence of title, any other indicia of ownership of, a vessel or facility[.]"); H.R. REP. No.
253(IV), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 63 reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. AND ADMIN. NEWS
3068, 3093 [hereinafter H.R. REP. 253 (IV)] ("'Owner' is defined to include not only those
persons who hold title to a vessel or pipeline but those who, in the absence of holding a title,
possess some equivalent evidence of ownership.").
71. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1988); H.R. REP. 172, supra note 70 at 6213 (definition
of owner "does not include a person who, without participating in the management or opera-
tion of a vessel or facility, holds indicia of ownership primarily to protect his security interest
in the vessel or facility"); H.R. REP. No. 99-253(IV), supra note 70 at 3093 (definition of
owner "does not include certain persons possessing indicia of ownership (such as a financial
institution) who, without participating in the management or operation of a vessel or pipeline,
hold title in order to secure a loan"). See also Berz & Sexton, Superfund Collides with Lenders'
Concerns, 13 LEGAL TIMES 15 (Dec. 23-30, 1985), in which the authors argue that a mortga-
gee who acquires title through foreclosure should remain immune from Superfund liability,
provided it acts at all times to protect its collateral. "It is not legal title which necessarily
subjects the holder to 'owner' or 'operator' liability under Superfund, but the purpose for
which title is held." Id. (emphasis in original; footnote omitted.) In an accompanying foot-
note, the authors make the following observation:
[T]he scant legislative history of the "owner/operator" definition makes clear
that the exemption was intended to protect all secured creditors, even those ac-
tually holding title, and to thereby encourage continued lending, particularly
institutional lending: "[The term owner] does not include certain persons pos-
sessing indicia of ownership (such as financial institutions) who, without partici-
pating in the management or operation of a vessel or facility, hold title either in
order to secure a loan or in connection with a lease financing arrangement under
the appropriate banking laws, rules and regulations."
Id. at 18 n.18 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 35, reprinted in
1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6119, 6181 (emphasis in original)). See also In re
T.P. Long Chemical, Inc., 45 Bankr. 278 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985) (stating in dicta that credi-
tors do not assume responsibility for public risks posed by collateral merely by taking a secur-
ity interest therein). "[E]ven if [the secured lender] had repossessed its collateral pursuant to
its security agreement it would not be an 'owner or operator' as defined under CERCLA"
because it held indicia of ownership primarily to protect its security interest and did not par-
ticipate in management of the tainted facility. Id. at 288-89.
Unlike the lenders in the cases discussed herein, the lender in T.P Long held a security
interest in personal property rather than a mortgage on real property. Id. at 280. Because a
party must own or operate the facility before incurring liability, an unsecured lender or one
holding security in personal property could be liable under CERCLA only as an operator,
absent application of an ownership standard of liability akin to that articulated by the Eleventh
Circuit in Fleet Factors. See infra notes 93-94 and accompanying text. Thus, the Maryland
Bank and Guidice holdings are of no concern to such lenders.
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Neither the statute nor its legislative history supports the theory that protec-
tion under the secured creditor exemption magically disappears at the mo-
ment the lender-mortgagee becomes the lender-owner. The title holder's
reasons for holding indicia of ownership and the extent to which it is in-
volved in managing the facility cannot be ignored by the courts. To hold
otherwise is to misconstrue the express language of the statute and its legisla-
tive history.7
2
C. 1986 Amendments
As the Guidice court noted, Congress amended the definition of "owner or
operator" in 1986 to exclude state and local governments that acquire own-
ership or control "involuntarily through bankruptcy, tax delinquency, aban-
donment, or other circumstances in which the government involuntarily
acquires title by virtue of its function as sovereign." 73 This amendment
prompted the following response from the court: "That Congress did not
simultaneously amend the statute to exclude from liability lenders who ac-
quire property through foreclosure might indicate that Congress intended to
hold them liable as owners."'74
The court could have strengthened its argument further by noting that the
amendment also imposes liability on a governmental entity "that has caused
or contributed to the release or threatened release of a hazardous substance
from the facility." 75 The new language suggests that the definition of
''owner or operator" was altered to prevent innocent governmental entities
- and, indirectly, innocent taxpayers - from incurring CERCLA liability
as a result of merely acquiring legal title to tainted property. Why not in-
clude innocent title holders, such as commercial banks, as well? Addition-
ally, Congress believed that bankruptcy, tax delinquency, abandonment, and
foreclosure are similar to each other.76 This negates the theory that liability
72. As Judge Kozinski wrote, "the undisputed facts must demonstrate both that the
[lender-title holder] holds [such] indicia of ownership primarily to protect its security interest
in the... plant and that it did not participate in the management of the plant" before a court
will grant a lender's motion for summary judgment premised on the secured creditor exemp-
tion. In re Bergsoe Metal Corp., 910 F.2d 668, 671 (9th Cir. 1990) (emphasis added).
The apparently inconsistent results in Mirabile and Maryland Bank can be reconciled under
this two-pronged analysis. In Mirabile, the fact that ABT's actions were taken during a rela-
tively short four-month period suggests that ABT held title for purposes of protecting its se-
curity interest, and in examining the second prong, the court held that ABT's post-foreclosure
actions did not constitute participation in the management of the site. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L.
Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20,996. In Maryland Bank, MB&T held title for at least four years,
and one year prior to cleanup. The extended length of time strongly suggests that MB&T was
holding indicia of ownership as an investment rather than primarily to protect its security
interest, thus rendering an examination of the second prong moot. Maryland Bank, 632 F.
Supp. at 579-80. Whether the lender in Guidice would be liable under this analysis is indeter-
minable from the opinion, which fails to discuss NBC's post-foreclosure activities during the
nine months it held legal title to the tainted property. The opinion does indicate, however, that
NBC's pre-foreclosure activities were taken in an attempt to protect its security interest.
Guidice, 732 F. Supp. at 561-62.
73. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(D) (1988).
74. 732 F. Supp. at 563.
75. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(D) (1988).
76. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1988) ("The term 'owner or operator' means... (iii) in
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fluctuates with the manner in which title is involuntarily acquired. Again,
why not include foreclosing lenders in the amendment?
Concededly, failure to amend the definition of "owner or operator" to
exclude from liability lenders who acquire property through foreclosure
might indicate that Congress intended to hold them liable as owners. How-
ever, failure to so amend the statute could just as easily indicate that Con-
gress considered such an amendment superfluous. As noted earlier, the
legislative history indicates that indicia of ownership includes outright ti-
tle.77 This history also indicates that such a lender is already immune from
liability if it holds title primarily to protect a security interest and has not
participated in managing the borrower's facility.78 With such protection al-
ready existing, Congress may have asked itself why lenders needed any addi-
tional protection. What Congress might have intended and actually
intended may be entirely different. Absent legislative history clearly indicat-
ing the latter, courts should hesitate to use conjecture as a foundation for
buttressing already shaky legal conclusions.
D. Windfall Profits
The courts in both Maryland Bank and Guidice feared that permitting a
mortgagee-turned-owner to claim the secured creditor exemption would
contradict the policies underlying CERCLA.79
Under the scenario put forward by the bank, the federal government
alone would shoulder the cost of cleaning up the site, while the former
mortgagee-turned-owner, [sic] would benefit from the clean-up by the
increased value of the now unpolluted land. At the foreclosure sale, the
mortgagee could acquire the property cheaply. All other prospective
purchasers would be faced with potential CERCLA liability, and would
shy away from the sale. Yet once the property has been cleared at the
taxpayers' expense and becomes marketable, the mortgagee-turned-
owner would be in a position to sell the site at a profit.80
Although such reasoning cannot be faulted,81 it does not support an auto-
the case of any facility, title or control of which was conveyed due to bankruptcy, foreclosure,
tax delinquency, abandonment, or similar means to a unit of State or local government, any
person who owned, operated or otherwise controlled activities at such facility immediately
beforehand.") (emphasis added).
77. See supra note 70.
78. 42 U.S.C. 9601(20)(A) (1988). See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
79. Maryland Bank, 632 F. Supp. at 580; Guidice, 732 F. Supp. at 563.
80. 632 F. Supp. at 580. See also Guidice, 732 F. Supp. at 563 (relying partly on Mary-
land Bank in holding that "[w]hen a lender is the successful purchaser at a foreclosure sale, the
lender should be liable to the same extent as any other bidder at the sale would have been.").
81. The legislative history of the CERCLA lien provisions, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9607(l)
(1988) and enacted as part of the 1986 amendments, indicates that Congress shares the wind-
fall profits concern. See H.R. REP. No. 99-253(111), 99th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1986
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWs 3038, 3040 (federal lien provisions enacted "to ensure
that the owners of the property where a clean-up has occurred will not receive a windfall profit
as a result of the clean-up."). Unlike certain state environmental liens, the CERCLA lien
attaches only to the tainted property and is subject to the rights afforded by applicable state
law to purchasers and secured creditors. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(1)(1)(B) (1988). Cf Civins, Lender
Concerns Under Environmental Laws, 20 ST. B. TEX. ENVTL. L. J. 93, 95 & notes 12-13
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matic emasculation of the protections afforded by the secured creditor ex-
emption immediately upon foreclosure. The windfall profits argument
makes sense in situations where the lender forecloses and thereafter holds
title for a significant period of time during which the EPA cleans the site -
a scenario akin to Maryland Bank.82 In a situation where the lender fore-
closes and shortly thereafter transfers title without knowledge of any envi-
ronmental problems or waiting for EPA cleanup,83 such as in Mirabile,84 the
policy underlying the windfall profits argument is not advanced. In such
instances, a title-holding lender should be permitted to present evidence that
it can avail itself of the secured creditor exclusion. This view does not negate
the logic of the windfall profits argument but merely recognizes that such
logic does not universally apply to all foreclosure scenarios.
III. FLEET FACTORS AND FLEETING PROTECTION
A lender may incur liability for environmental clean-up costs if it is the
present owner or operator of the facility or the former owner or operator of
the facility when hazardous substances were disposed.8 5 In either case, the
lender must be an owner or operator to incur liability. As previously dis-
cussed, the statutory definition of owner or operator and the underlying leg-
islative history offer little practical guidance on the meaning of the two
terms.86 Both sources clearly indicate, however, that a person who holds
(1990) (Statutes enacted in Arkansas, Connecticut, and Tennessee, among other states, impose
super-priority liens over all other liens, except real estate tax liens. Statutes enacted in Maine,
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and New Jersey impose super-priority liens which, if re-
corded first, attach to all the owner's real and personal property).
82. The length of time title is held after foreclosure may be the most important evidence
in determining why such indicia of ownership is held. As the duration increases, the chances
of successfully arguing that title is held primarily to protect a security interest diminish. Con-
sequently, a court will be more likely to conclude that the motive for holding title is profit-
oriented. But see United States v. Carolawn Co., 14 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,698,
20,698-99 (D.S.C. 1984) (defendant could be liable for acting as "conduit" and holding title to
hazardous waste site for less than one hour).
83. A lender with knowledge of the presence of hazardous substances on the property
must disclose such presence to a prospective purchaser. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(C) (1988). Be-
cause such a purchaser would be precluded from asserting the third-party defense (see 42
U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A)(i) (1988) and supra note 30) the lender may be forced to hold title to the
property until after the environmental problems have been remedied, at which time the wind-
fall profits argument becomes attractive.
A lender with knowledge of the presence of hazardous substances may decline to disclose
such knowledge to a purchaser. Such a decision precludes a lender from raising the third party
defense. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(C) (1988). The lender may still argue, however, that it is
immune from liability under the secured creditor exemption. Nevertheless, such a lender
could incur liability under a host of other legal or equitable theories, not the least of which
would be fraud.
84. 15 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20,996.
85. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1), (2) (1988).
86. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1988); supra notes 6, 70; H.R. REP. 172, supra note 70,
at 6181-82 ("In the case of a facility, an 'operator' is defined to be a person who is carrying out
operational functions for the owner of the facility pursuant to an appropriate agreement.");
H.R. REP. 253(IV), supra note 70, at 3093 (" 'Operator' is one of the classes of responsible
persons subject to liability under the Act. Operators of vessels do not include those individuals
who are not totally responsible for the operation of a vessel. To fall within the definition, the
individual must have assumed the full range of operational responsibility.").
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indicia of ownership primarily to protect its security interest is neither an
owner nor an operator absent participation in the management of the tainted
property.87 The following analysis of the initial appellate examination of the
secured creditor exemption suggests that the court misconstrued the phrase,
"participating in the management," when articulating its liability standard
and that such misconstruction will prompt lenders to act in a manner at
odds with the court's intent.
A. Participating in the Management v. Operation
Premised on its conclusion that the terms "participating in the manage-
ment" and "operation" were incongruent, 88 the court held that a lender
could be liable for either operating the troubled site or holding indicia of
ownership and managing the facility to the extent necessary to preclude ap-
plication of the secured creditor exemption. 89 While the court's ability to
engage in semantic warfare is commendable, the necessity for doing so is
unclear. Far worse, the court's standard conflicts with unambiguous statu-
tory language and could result in holding an innocent party liable.
A lender who holds indicia of ownership and becomes overly entangled in
managing the facility cannot avail itself of the protection afforded by the
exclusionary language. Nevertheless, and contrary to the court's interpreta-
tion, such a lender is not automatically liable merely because it cannot suc-
cessfully claim the exemption unless its actions also prompt the conclusion
that the lender is an owner or operator. Furthermore, a lender who "oper-
ates" the facility is not liable if the secured creditor exemption is applicable,
for in such a situation the lender is expressly excluded from the definition of
"owner or operator." Such liability, however, could result under the appel-
late panel's standard.
Whether or not the meanings of "participating in the management" and
"operation" are congruent, the statute requires a court to examine the two
provisions in harmony.90 The Eleventh Circuit's construction is anything
but harmonious and, ironically, bears the imprint of "ignor[ing] the plain
language" it so quickly placed on the reasoning of lower courts. 9 ' When
such an imprint could result in liability being placed on an otherwise inno-
cent lender, the reasoning leading to such a result should be reconsidered.
87. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1988); supra note 71.
88. Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1557.
89. Id. at 1556 n.6, 1557. Why the court did not compare and contrast participation in
management with "owner or" operator or "owning or" operating is unclear. Perhaps the
court was attempting to limit its reasoning to the facts, which suggested that Fleet Factors was
not an owner because it had not foreclosed on its mortgage. Yet, in articulating its novel
standard, the court imposed liability on Fleet Factors not as an operator, but as an owner. Id.
at 1557 ("Under the standard we adopt today, a secured creditor may incur section 9607(a)(2)
liability, without being an operator .. ") (emphasis added).
90. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1988).
91. 901 F.2d at 1557.
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B Inferences and Financial Management
The Eleventh Circuit's distinction between "participating in the manage-
ment" and "operation" 92 was merely a prelude to an edict even more troub-
ling to lenders. Under the circuit court's liability standard, a secured
creditor can be liable as an owner prior to foreclosure if its involvement in
facility management would support the inference that it could, if it so chose,
influence its borrower's hazardous waste disposal decisions. 9 3 In the court's
opinion, a "lender's capacity to influence a debtor facility's treatment of haz-
ardous waste will be inferred from the extent of its involvement in the facil-
ity's financial management." '94
Much to the dismay of the financial community, liability under the appel-
late standard is premised on what a lender's activities suggest it could do,
rather than on what a lender has done or is doing.95 The standard correctly
requires a lender to be involved in managing the facility before it is pre-
vented from claiming that it is not an owner or operator under the secured
creditor exemption. The flaw in the standard, however, is that it permits the
mere inference of what a lender could do to support the legal conclusion
regarding what the lender has done: involved itself in managing the facil-
ity.9 6 The statutory language itself counsels against imposing liability on
mere ability to exercise control,97 and the overwhelming majority of courts
that have addressed the issue have rejected such a notion.98 Further, one of
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1557-58.
94. Id. at 1559 n.13.
95. Id. at 1557-58.
96. Rather than permitting inferences to support a finding of actual involvement in man-
agement, the Eleventh Circuit's holding arguably is comprised of two independent require-
ments: (1) the lender must be involved in managing the facility and (2) the lender's degree of
managerial involvement must, at a minimum, support the inference that the lender could influ-
ence hazardous waste disposal decisions if it so chose. Id. at 1558. This argument is tenuous
for the following reason. A lender is liable for environmental cleanup as an owner or operator
unless it can successfully invoke the secured creditor exemption. This exemption is unavaila-
ble to a lender who participates in managing the borrower's facility, however, regardless of
inferences drawn from such managerial participation. Therefore, requiring the presence of
such inferences in addition to actual managerial involvement is irrelevant.
97. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (20)(A) (1988) ("owned, operated or otherwise controlled" and
"participating in the management"); see also H.R. REP. 172, supra note 70, at 6182 (defining
an operator as "a person who is carrying out operational functions"); H.R. REP. 253(IV),
supra note 70, at 3093 ("To fall within the definition [of operator], the individual must have
assumed the full range of operational responsibility.").
98. See, e.g., Bergsoe Metal Corp., 910 F.2d at 672 ("It is clear from the statute that,
whatever the precise parameters of 'participation,' there must be some actual management of
the facility before a secured creditor will fall outside the exception."); id. at 672-73 ("What is
critical is not what rights the Port may have had, but what it did. The CERCLA security
interest exemption uses the active 'participating in management.' Regardless of what rights
the Port may have had, it cannot have participated in management if it never exercised
them."); United States v. New Castle Co., 727 F. Supp. 854, 866 (D.Del. 1989) (court rejected
argument that ability to, rather than actual, control established CERCLA liability); Rockwell
Int'l Corp. v. IU Int'l Corp., 702 F. Supp. 1384, 1390 (N.D. Ill. 1988) ("Mere ability to exer-
cise control as a result of the financial relationship of the parties is insufficient for liability to
attach. The entity must actually exercise control."); Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan
Materials Co., 685 F. Supp. 651, 656-57 (N.D. Ill. 1987) aff'd, 861 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1988)
"Again, the clear language of § 9607(a)(2) imposes liability only upon those who actually oper-
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the policies underlying CERCLA-to impose liability on parties who are
responsible for environmental problems-suggests that a lender must act
before a court will impose such liability.
Of additional concern to lenders is that the court, in using a lender's finan-
cial involvement as a benchmark against which its participation in facility
management is determined, articulates a standard that effectively emascu-
lates the secured creditor exemption. All lenders are involved in the finan-
cial aspects of their borrowers; such involvement is inherent in the debtor-
creditor relationship. 99 Additionally, any financial involvement by a lender,
no matter how attenuated to environmental concerns, can support the infer-
ence that the lender is able to influence a borrower's hazardous waste dispo-
sal decisions. For example, regardless of the size of the loan, the type of
collateral, or the nature of the borrower's business, most lenders require
their borrowers to comply with certain financial ratios, maintain adequate
insurance and fund any pension obligations. To the extent such covenants
direct the flow of funds so as to preclude the simultaneous remedy of hazard-
ous waste problems, their inclusion in the loan papers suggests the inference
that the lender is influencing a borrower's environmental decisions, thus trig-
gering liability under the appellate court's standard.1° °
If CERCLA liability is imposed under a standard that permits little, if
ate a 'facility' within the meaning of CERCLA .... Only those who actually operate or
exercise control over the facility that creates an environmental risk can be held liable under
CERCLA for the costs of reducing that risk."). But see United States v. Northeastern Phar-
maceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 849 (W.D. Mo. 1984) (emphasis on management
capacity and ability to control), modified, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct.
146 (1987).
99. The degree of such involvement most often is influenced by the perceived financial
strength of the borrower and the current market value of any collateral. The ever-changing
nature of these factors, often tempered by events outside either party's control, necessitates the
inclusion of financial and other representations, warranties, and covenants in loan documents.
100. Unlike covenants, which are promises to perform in a certain manner, a borrower's
representations and warranties constitute a statement of fact as of a particular time. Thus,
they do not support any inference that the lender is influencing or could influence managerial
decisions concerning environmental matters. Therefore, a lender concerned about environ-
mental liability should not hesitate to demand that the borrower provide detailed environmen-
tal representations and warranties. Some suggested examples, together with definitions of
terms used therein, follow:
(i) Borrower is not, nor will the execution, delivery, performance, or observance of the loan
papers cause Borrower to be, in violation of any Environmental Laws.
(ii) No notice, notification, demand, request for information, citation, summons, or order
has been issued, no complaint has been filed, no penalty has been assessed, and no investigation
or review is pending or threatened by any Tribunal or other person or entity with respect to
any alleged violation of any Environmental Law (including, without limitation, any genera-
tion, treatment, storage, recycling, transportation, disposal, or release of any Hazardous Sub-
stance generated by the operations or business, or located on, under, or at any property, of
Borrower).
(iii) Except in compliance with Environmental Laws and permits issued thereunder, neither
Borrower nor any other person or entity has generated, treated, stored, recycled, transported,
disposed, or released any Hazardous Substance on, under, or at any property now or previ-
ously owned or leased by Borrower, and no property of Borrower has been used (whether by
Borrower or by any other person or entity) as a dump or storage site, whether permanent or
temporary, for any Hazardous Substance.
(iv) No property now or previously owned or leased by Borrower is listed or, to Borrower's
knowledge, proposed for listing on any contaminated site list promulgated pursuant to any
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any, financial involvement,' 0 a lender likely will conclude that it cannot
adequately protect its investment and refuse to make the loan. In turn, bor-
rowers will be unable to obtain the funds necessary to remedy their environ-
mental problems, thus leaving federal and state agencies to pick up the ever-
increasing tab for clean-up costs. Because any evaporation of the available
credit pool would impair the furtherance of CERCLA's policy of avoiding
remediation of privately-caused problems with public funds, other courts
should hesitate to adopt the analysis of the Eleventh Circuit as their own.
Instead, the courts should strive to fashion a liability standard that seeks to
reconcile a lender's need to manage its loan portfolio with the EPA's obliga-
tion to clean up hazardous waste sites with money gleaned from the pockets
of the responsible party.
Environmental Law, and Borrower knows of no circumstance that could result in such listing
or proposed listing.
(v) There are no environmental Liens on any of the property owned or leased by Borrower,
and no actions by any Tribunal have been taken or are in process which could subject any of
such property to such Liens.
(vi) Prior to the date hereof, Borrower has provided to Lender all environmental investiga-
tions, studies, audits, tests, reviews, or other analyses (collectively, the "Environmental Site
Analyses") conducted by, or which are in the possession of, Borrower relating to any property
now or previously owned or leased by Borrower. The Environmental Site Analyses furnished
to Lender by Borrower are accurate and complete.
(vii) Except as previously disclosed to Lender in writing, there have been no communica-
tions or agreements with any Tribunal or any private entity, including, but not limited to, any
prior owners of the property, relating in any way to any liability arising from or the violation
of any Environmental Law.
(viii) Borrower knows of no condition or circumstance, such as the presence of any Hazard-
ous Substances, that could materially and adversely affect the fair market value of Borrower's
property.
Environmental Law means any Law that relates to the environment or generation, treat-
ment, storage, recycling, transportation, disposal, or release of Hazardous Substances; Hazard-
ous Substance means any hazardous or toxic waste, pollutant, contaminant, or substance that
is the subject of any Law; Law means all applicable statutes, laws, treaties, ordinances, rules,
regulations, orders, writs, injunctions, decrees, judgments, or opinions of any Tribunal; and
Tribunal means any local, state, or federal judicial, executive, or legislative instrumentality.
In many situations, a corporate borrower is the sole or majority shareholder of other enti-
ties. A lender should require such subsidiaries to make similar representations and warranties
because courts have held a parent company liable for the environmental sins of its subsidiary.
See, e.g., United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 724 F. Supp. 15, 20-23 (D.R.I. 1989), aff'd in
part, 910 F.2d 24 (1st Cir. 1990), petition for cert. filed, 59 U.S.W. 3406 (U.S. Dec. 4, 1990)
(No. 90-816) (court found parent was both owner and operator of subsidiary under CER-
CLA); United States v. McGraw-Edison Co., 718 F. Supp. 154, 158 (W.D.N.Y. 1989) (court
denied summary judgment motion of 49% shareholder); United States v. Nicolet, Inc., 712 F.
Supp. 1193, 1202-03 (E.D.Pa. 1989) (parent with significant financial or ownership interest in
subsidiary liable for subsidiary's CERCLA costs); Idaho v. Bunker Hill Co., 635 F. Supp. 665,
671-72 (D. Idaho 1986) (parent with capacity to control, and authority to prevent damage
caused by, disposals and releases of hazardous waste at subsidiary's facility was owner or oper-
ator). But see Joslyn Mfg. Co. v. T.L. James & Co., 893 F.2d 80, 83 (5th Cir. 1990), petition
for cert. filed, 59 U.S.L.W. 3058 (U.S. July 24, 1990) (No. 89-1973) (parent not liable for
subsidiary's cleanup costs when subsidiary maintained statutory corporate formalities). See
generally Note, Liability of Parent Corporations for Hazardous Waste Cleanup and Damages,
99 HARv. L. REV. 986 (1986) (discussing parent liability for subsidiary's clean-up costs).
101. The Eleventh Circuit would permit a lender to become involved in "occasional and
discrete financial decisions relating to the protection of its security interest without incurring
liability." Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1558. Unable to locate the oasis of safety in the desert of
liability, most lenders will draw little comfort from this statement until future caselaw provides
guidance on the meaning of the inherently speculative phrase, "occasional and discrete."
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C. Incentive or Disincentive?
Perhaps the greatest shortcoming in the court's reasoning is its belief that
a broad construction of the phrase "participating in the management" fur-
thers the remediation of environmental problems by the lending community.
Because the parameters of CERCLA liability remain nebulous, the court
correctly surmised that its ruling not only should, but will, "encourage po-
tential creditors to investigate thoroughly the waste treatment systems and
policies of potential debtors. '102 To suggest further, however, that a lender
can adequately protect itself by weighing and incorporating the risks associ-
ated with the negative results of such due diligence into the terms of its loan
documents 10 3 is, as one critic noted, naive. 1° 4 Rarely can such risks be
quantified with any degree of certainty or comfort, especially when the con-
tours of environmental liability are subject to the vagaries of judicial inter-
preters. Furthermore, lenders that extend credit to borrowers laden with
environmental difficulties will do anything but "monitor the hazardous
waste treatment systems and policies of their debtors and insist upon compli-
ance with acceptable treatment standards as a prerequisite to continued and
future financial support.' 005 To do so is to participate in the very type of
management upon which the Eleventh Circuit premised liability. Thus,
rather than providing financial institutions with a "strong incentive to ad-
dress hazardous waste problems" at the facilities of their borrowers, the
court's attempt at honing the law ironically provides the lending community
with an excellent reason for "studiously avoiding the investigation and ame-
lioration" of such hazardous waste problems-a result the court expressly
sought to avoid.' 0 6
The test also will preclude the closing of many loan transactions. A
lender confronted with the discovery of an environmental problem during
the term of the loan will find itself between the proverbial rock and a hard
place. Whether or not the lender withholds or extends the credit necessary
to remedy the situation, its conduct infers an ability to influence its bor-
rower's hazardous waste disposal decisions. Rather than find itself in such a
quandary, a lender simply may decide not to enter into a credit relationship
with the borrower. As previously noted, the absence of such a relationship
only increases the likelihood that federal or state agencies will bear the ini-
tial, and perhaps ultimate, financial burden of remediation.
IV. CONCLUSION
The confusion created by the various judicial interpretations of the se-
cured creditor exemption may provide an impetus for reconsideration of leg-
islation previously introduced in Congress. Such legislation would have
expressly excluded from the definition of "owner or operator" lenders who
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Connelly, Superfund Whacks the Banks, WALL ST. J., Aug. 28, 1990, at AI0, col. 3.
105. Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1558.
106. Id. at 1559.
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foreclosed on their security interests and in no way caused, contributed to,
or exacerbated the environmental problems.' 0 7 Such legislation, if enacted,
would mitigate the harsh and automatic results of the holdings in Maryland
Bank and Guidice but would leave intact the mischief created by the Elev-
enth Circuit.
The EPA, believing that clarification would best be accomplished through
agency regulation, has promulgated a rule that clarifies what actions a lender
may take and still remain within the bounds of the secured creditor exemp-
tion.10 8 The rule responds to the holdings of Maryland Bank and Guidice by
permitting a lender to foreclose on its mortgage without automatically losing
the protection of the exemption. Perhaps of most interest to financial insti-
tutions, however, is the rule's definition of "participation in management,"
which expressly refutes any suggestion that the phrase includes mere capac-
ity or ability to influence facility operations. In this manner the rule, if
adopted, would greatly alleviate the concerns prompted by the holding in
Fleet Factors.
The EPA may replace those concerns with others, however. The interpre-
tive ruling precludes a lender from falling within the ambit of the exemption
if it fails to undertake an environmental audit or examination of the collat-
eral securing loans made after the rule becomes effective. Furthermore, a
lender may lose the statutory protection if its failure to act while winding up
operations caused or contributed to environmental contamination. In addi-
tion, a lender will negate the exemption if it fails to foreclose or otherwise
acquire or protect its collateral or delays foreclosure for an unreasonable
period of time once the loan is nonperforming. On the other hand, a lender
that acquires property by default, foreclosure, or similar means must sell or
otherwise divest itself of the property within six months; otherwise, the
107. See H.R. REP. 4494, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. REC. E1024 (April 4, 1990).
The proposed amendment would have excluded from the definition of owner or operator any
"designated lending institution which acquires ownership or control of the facility pursuant to
the terms of a security interest held by the person in that facility." Id. The amendment de-
fined "designated lending institution" to include all depository institutions (as defined at 12
U.S.C. § 461(b)(l)(A) (1988)) and other "bona fide lending institutions" that make aggregate
real estate loans in excess of $1,000,000 to at least 25 borrowers during the one-year period
beginning six months before, and ending six months after, the date on which the lender per-
fected its security interest in the facility. Id. Similar legislation was introduced in the Senate.
See S. 2827, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. REC. S172 (June 28, 1990) (introduction of S.
2827); id. at 110, 115-16 (July 19, 1990) (comments by co-sponsor). The 101st Congress ad-
journed without taking action on either reform bill.
For an analysis of these and other legislative options, see Unterberger, Lender liability
Under Superfund: What the Congress Meant to Say Was ... , 5 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) 541
(Part I) (Sept. 19, 1990), 569 (Part II) (Sept. 26, 1990).
108. A copy of the interpretive ruling can be found at 55 BNA's Banking Report 636-42
(Oct. 15, 1990). The ruling will become effective upon publication in the Federal Register.
Thereafter, the EPA will accept public comment for 60 days and then will formally codify the
rule in volume 40 of the Code of Federal Regulations. Id. at 637.
Citing United States Supreme Court caselaw, one commentator argues that courts will not
be bound by the EPA's administrative interpretation of the secured creditor exemption. See
O'Brien, Environmental Lender Liability: Will an Administrative Fix Work?, 5 Toxics L. Rep.
(BNA) 512 (Sept. 12, 1990).
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lender bears the burden of proving that it continued to hold the property
after such period primarily to protect its security interest.
Because environmentalists and the lending community will have differing
views on how, and whether, CERCLA should be amended, 1°9 any binding
legislative or regulatory guidance may not be forthcoming for some time and
may fall far short of clearly defining what actions a lender may take without
becoming an owner or operator.110 Until such time, lenders must implement
credit policies that will mitigate the scope of potential liability under stan-
dards promulgated by the courts. Of paramount importance to a lender
should be its due diligence before the loan is funded, which, at a minimum,
should include an environmental audit conducted by an experienced consult-
ant."' If, after conducting its due diligence, the lender decides to extend
credit, then the lender should include detailed environmental representations
and warranties in the loan papers." 2 In addition, the lender should obtain
environmental indemnification from the borrower and other related parties,
such as major shareholders, officers, and directors." 13
Historically, a lender also would include financial and environmental cov-
enants in the loan papers, together with provisions permitting it to take cer-
tain actions if the borrower breached such covenants. Whether a lender
should continue to include such covenants and remedy provisions in light of
Fleet Factors is a question that cannot be summarily answered. Absent an
affirmative response, many lenders will refuse to extend credit. Ironically,
judicial decisions that prompt a reduction in the amount of available capital
necessary to remedy today's many environmental problems effectively place
the financial burden of remediation on the shoulders of those CERCLA was
enacted to protect - the general public. Hopefully, such irony will not be
lost on Congress, the EPA, and the courts.
109. E.g., Banks, Environmentalists Each See the Other Winning in EPA Superfund Rule,
11 Inside E.P.A. 5 (Oct. 12, 1990).
110. See House Panel Drafts Narrowing Amendments to Superfund Lender Exemption, 11
INSIDE E.P.A. 12 (Sept. 7, 1990).
111. For a discussion of environmental audits, see Cogen, Ford & McCreary, What You
Need To Know About Environmental Audits, 35 PRAC. LAW. 17 (1989); Hogan & Bromberg,
The Hidden Hazards of the Environmental Audit, 36 PRAC. LAW. 15 (1990); Kane, Screening
Real Estate for Environmental Problems, 72 J. COM. BANK LENDING 4 (1990); Payne, A Prac-
tical Approach to Environmental Audits, 5 PRAC. REAL EST. LAW. 83 (1989); Note, Viable
Protection Mechanisms for Lenders Against Hazardous Waste Liability, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV.
89, 106-14 (1989).
112. See supra note 101 (suggested examples).
113. Such agreements are enforceable between the parties but not against the government.
See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(e) (1988). See also Marmon Group, Inc. v. Rexnord, Inc., 822 F.2d 31,
33-34 (7th Cir. 1987) (party seeking indemnification under contractual indemnity clause for
violation of environmental regulation not in existence at inception of contract had possible
cause of action under the indemnity provision); Southland Corp. v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 696 F.
Supp. 994, 1000 (D.N.J. 1988) (private parties can contract to indemnify or be indemnified for
CERCLA costs); Versatile Metals, Inc. v. Union Corp., 693 F. Supp. 1563, 1569 (E.D. Pa.
1988)(party seeking enforcement of indemnification provisions must perform its contractual
obligations); Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 669 F.
Supp. 1285, 1295 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (express, but not implied, contractual indemnity provisions
are enforceable); Gershonowitz, What Should Be in Environmental Indemnity Clauses, 5
PRAC. REAL EST. LAW. 55 (1989) (outlining problems peculiar to drafting effective environ-
mental indemnity clauses).
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